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Deferring Unfair Labor Practice 
Charges . To Pre-existing 
Arbitration Awards 
A controversial area in the field of labor 
law is the National Labor Relations Board 
policy of deferring unfair labor practice 
charges to pre-existing arbitration awards. 
This article traces the history of the 
Board's policy from the Spielberg doctrine 
to the Olin policy. 
The National Labor Relations Act was 
enacted by Congress in 1935 with the aim 
of eliminating industrial unrest caused by 
the denial of collective bargaining rights to 
workers. Section 1 of the Act states: 
Experience has proved that protection-
by law of the right of employees to 
organize and bargain collectively safe-
guards commerce from injury, impair-
ment, or interruption, and promotes 
the flow of commerce by removing 
certain recognized sources of industrial 
strife and unrest, by encouraging prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly 
adjustment of industrial disputes aris-
ing out of difference as to wages, hours 
or other working conditions, and by 
restoring quality of bargaining power 
between employers and employees. 1 
Section 7 of the Act provides that "em-
ployees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protec-
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tion ... "2 Section 8(a) (1) of the Act states 
that it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in Section 7."3 Section 
8(a) (3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor 
practice for an employer to discriminate 
"in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organiza-
tion ... "4 Section 8(a) (5) of the Act pro-
vides that it is an unfair labor practice for 
an employer "to refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of his 
employees, subject to the provisions of 
Section 9( a). "5 
Congress, in Section 3 of the Act, creat-
ed the National Labor Relations Board to 
administer the Act. Section 10(a) of the 
Act grants the Board the power "to pre-
vent any person from engaging in any 
unfair labor practice."6 Thus, Congress 
established a forum for workers to seek 
redress of violations of their Section 7 and 
8 rights. When an individual believes he is 
the victim of an unfair labor practice he 
may file a charge with one of the Board's 
regional offices. The case is assigned to a 
Board agent who investigates the matter 
and decides whether or not to recommend 
that a complaint be issued against the 
charged party. The Board has the power to 
serve orders requiring charged parties to 
cease and desist from such unfair labor 
practices as well as ordering reinstatement 
of illegally discharged employees with 
back pay.7 If a complaint is issued the 
charged party has the right to request that 
the case be brought before an adminis-
trative law judge for a hearing. Either par-
ty can appeal an ALJ decision to the full 
five person Board. 
Section 6 of the Act states that "the 
Board shall have the authority from time 
to time to make . . . such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of [the] Act."8 The Board has 
been accorded wide discretion since its 
inception in promulgating policy without 
judicial interference provided it has a 
rational basis for the policy.9 One such 
example is the Board's policy of deferral of 
unfair labor practice charges to pre-
existing arbitration awards. 
In Spielberg Manufacturing Company 
(1955)10 the union and the company agreed 
on arbitration as a method of resolving the 
status of four employees who were dis-
charged for picket line misconduct during 
a strike. A three-member arbitration panel 
found that the grievants were discharged 
for just cause. The union subsequently fil-
ed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
Board. The Board first stated that it is not 
bound by an arbitration award. The Board 
quoted the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Walt 
Disney Productions (1944) which stated, 
"Clearly agreements between private par-
ties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Board. We believe the Board may exercise 
jurisdiction in any case of an unfair labor 
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practice when in its discretion its inter-
ference is necessary to protect the public 
rights defined in the Act."11 Nevertheless, 
the Board deferred to the arbitration 
panel's decision, commonly referred to as 
the Spielberg doctrine. The Board declared 
that where the arbitration proceedings 
appear to have been fair and regular, all 
parties have agreed to be bound, and the 
decision of the arbitrator is not clearly 
repugnant to the purposes and policies of 
the Act, it would defer.12 The Board stated 
that deferring in those circumstances 
would best serve the "desirable objective 
of encouraging the voluntary settlement of 
labor disputes."13 The Board declined to 
answer whether it would have decided the 
strike misconduct issue the same way as 
the arbitrator decided. 
In Raytheon Company (1962)14 the Board 
ntled that it would not defer where the 
record indicated that the arbitrator did not 
consider the unfair labor practice issue 
brought before him. IS In Raytheon the 
grievant was discharged for allegedly incit-
ing a walkout. The case proceeded to arbi-
tration where the termination was upheld. 
The Board refused to defer, citing three 
reasons: a) in opening argument at the 
arbitration hearing, counsel for the union 
specifically limited the scope of the arbitra-
tor's jurisdiction to the contractual issue; 
b) no evidence of the grievant's union 
activity establishing that the grievant was 
fired for protected or union activity was 
disclosed at the arbitration; and c) the com-
pany official who discharged the grievant 
and who testified at the unfair labor prac-
tice hearing in which the ALJ determined 
that the company violated section 8(a) (1) 
and (3) of the Act, did not appear at the 
arbitration. The Board, refusing to defer to 
the arbitrator's decision, concluded that 
the arbitrator limited his decision to the 
contractual issue. 
The dissent in Raytheon claimed that 
both the statutory and contractual issues 
were factually the same. "The underlying 
factual issue in both the arbitration and the 
unfair labor practice proceedings was 
whether the discharges engaged in a walk-
out or in conduct inciting a walkout."16 
The majority disagreed stating that the 
only factual issue presented to the arbitra-
tor was whether the discharge violated the 
no-strike clause of the contract. The arbi-
trator received no evidence of the grie-
vant's union activities or whether the 
discharge by Raytheon was motivated 
because of the grievant's union activity. 
Thus, the arbitrator did not pass upon the 
facts of the statutory issueY The Raytheon 
decision is important because the Board 
added a fourth criterion to the Spielberg 
doctrine. Now for the Board to defer, it 
has to be satisfied that the arbitrator pur-
ported to consider the unfair labor practice 
Issue. 
The Board further elaborated on the 
Raytheon standard in Airco Industrial Gases 
(1972).18 In A irco, the grievant was dis-
charged for negligence in his duties as a 
leadman in the trailer maintenance depart-
ment. In the arbitration proceeding the 
union stated that the issue to be decided 
was whether the grievant was fired in vio-
lation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The agreement contained a clause 
prohibiting discrimination against any 
employee for union affiliation or activity. 
The grievant contended that his discharge 
was motivated by the fact that he had filed 
over 200 grievances in the previous two 
years of his employment; however, no evi-
dence of this issue was presented at the 
arbitration hearing. The arbitrator ruled 
that the discipline was for just cause but 
reduced it to a suspension. In upholding 
the ALl's decision not to defer, the Board 
the Board 
deferred to the 
arbitration panel's 
decision ... the 
Spielberg doctrine.:" 
maintained that there was no indication in 
the arbitrator's decision that he considered 
the issue of whether the grievant was fired 
for his union activity.19 The Board refuted 
the dissent's argument that the contract 
contained a clause prohibiting discrimina-
tion for union activity or affiliation and 
that therefore the individual was precluded 
from bringing the unfair labor practice 
charge: 
Apparently our dissenting colleague is 
of the same view (that the arbitrator 
did not consider the unfair labor prac-
tice issue), since he relies not only on 
the tenuous evidence that the unfair 
labor practice issue was in fact liti-
gated, but on a wholly new res judicata 
doctrine, under which he would hold 
that there was a duty to litigate it 
before the arbitrator. We do not accept 
this doctrine, which amounts to be an 
absolute abdication of the Board's 
responsibility simply because of a 
pious protestation in the contract that 
the Company will not discriminate against 
employees because of their union activities 
or affiliation.20 
In Yourga Trucking (1972)21 the Board 
held that the burden of proving that the 
unfair labor practice issue had been ade-
quately presented to and considered by the 
arbitrator rests with the party raising the 
affirmative defense.22 "That party may be 
presumed to have the strongest interest in 
establishing that the issue has been previ-
ously litigated, if that is the case."23 
Two years later, the Board overruled 
Airco and Yourga in Electronic Reproduc· 
tion Service Corporation (1974).24 In that 
decision the Board stated that in discharge 
and discipline cases, absent unusual cir-
cumstances, it would defer to an arbitra-
tion decision where the grieving party had 
an opportunity to present evidence of an 
unfair labor practice to the arbitrator.25 
The Board stated that the purpose of 
Spielberg was to encourage the resolution 
of disputes between unions and manage-
ment with the mechanism they voluntari-
ly created - the grievance and arbitration 
procedure. When the fact of a contractual 
dispute present an unfair labor practice 
issue as well, the Board stated that Spielberg 
dictated that the parties must resolve both 
issues in the arena upon which they mutu-
ally agreed provided that the arbitration 
proceeding is fair and regular, both parties 
agree to be bound, and the arbitrator's 
decision is not clearly repugnant to the 
Act. According to the Board, arbitration as 
a means of settling disputes discourages 
forum shopping and dual litigation and 
reduces the possibility that the individual 
will receive 'two bites of the apple.' The 
Board commented: 
If ... we are to continue to encourage, 
require and generally honor the use of 
available grievance and arbitration 
procedures to achieve dispute settle-
ment, we ought not encourage either 
party to withhold from those volun-
tary procedures full information or 
relevant evidence on issues scheduled 
for discussion in the grievance proce-
dure or for hearing by an arbitrator.26 
Thus, the Board reasoned that in discipline 
and discharge cases evidence showing that 
the grievant was disciplined in violation of 
the Act would have a bearing on the con-
tracutal issue and help determine whether 
the grievant was disciplined for just cause. 
The Board therefore concluded that absent 
a bona fide reason (such as unusual cir-
cumstances) it would defer to an arbitra-
tor's decision if the grievant is given the 
opportunity to present the unfair labor 
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practice issue even if the statutory issue 
was not actually presented. A scenario in 
which the Board would not defer is one 
where the arbitrator specifically refused to 
pass on the statutory issue, or where both 
parties agreed to exclude statutory issues 
from the arbitration proceeding. 
The dissent argued that the majority's 
ruling eliminated the Raytheon require-
ment that before deferring, the arbitrator 
must consider the unfair labor practice 
Issue. 
This means, of course, that the Board 
for all practicial purposes will no 
longer decide any part of a case which 
has been or could have been decided 
by an arbitrator who has issued an 
award. It also apparently means that 
the Board will defer to an arbitrator 
cases which have not yet been, but 
could be the subject of an award. 
Adding the two together means that 
the Board will not henceforth decide 
any statutory violations by a union or 
an employer where they have an arbi-
tration clause in their collective bar-
gaining agreement. That is, unions and 
employers can agree to contract them-
selves out of the Act by inserting an 
arbitration clause into the agreementP 
Electronic Reproduction represented a dif-
fering interpretation of Spielberg. A irco, 
adopting the Raytheon criterion, ruled that 
it would be an unwarranted extension of 
Spielberg to permit the Board to defer 
where there was no evidence that the arbi-
trator did not consider the unfair labor 
practice issue. Electronic Reproduction, 
however, stated that Spielberg embraced 
arbitration as the preferred method of dis-
pute resolution and that it would defer to 
that process when an unfair labor practice 
issue could be resolved there. While the 
Electronic Reproduction Board stated that it 
would not defer where the arbitrator speci-
fically refused to pass on the unfair labor 
practice issue, it was silent regarding its 
position towards an award where the arbi-
trator receives evidence of the statutory 
issue but does not consider it in his 
decision. 
unfair labor practice was not presented by 
the grievant at either of the arbitration 
hearings. The Board refused to defer stat-
ing that it had basically abandoned the 
Electronic Reproduction doctrine. "Our 
experience with Electronic Reproduction 
has led to the conclusion that it promotes 
the statutory purpose of encouraging 
collective-bargaining relationships, but 
derogates the equally important purpose 
of protecting employees in the exercise of 
their rights under Section 7 of the Act."29 
Thus, the Board stated that it would not 
defer unless the unfair labor practice issue 
was both presented to and considered by 
the arbitrator. "In accord with the rule 
formerly stated in Airco Industrial Gases, 
we will give no deference to an arbitration 
award which bears no indication that the 
arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue of 
"the Board ... 
would not defer 
unless the unfair 
labor practice issue 
was both presented 
to and considered by 
the arbitrator. n 
discrimination in determining the proprie-
ty of an employer's disciplinary's 
actions."3o Furthermore, the Board in Sub· 
urban Motor Freight stated that it would 
return to the Yourga standard and impose 
on the party seeking deferral the burden of 
proving that the statutory issue was liti-
gated before and decided by the arbitr-
tor.3l 
when deferring. The Board will defer 
unless the arbitrator's decision is "palpa-
bly wrong" and not susceptible to an inter-
pretation consistent with the Act. Finally, 
the Board will require the party arguing 
against deferral to show that the above cri-
teria have not been met.33 
In Olin, the grievant, the Union Presi-
dent, was discharged for his part in encour-
aging a "sick out" at work. At the 
arbitration hearing, the arbitrator found 
that the grievant partially caused and par-
ticipated in the "sick out" and failed to 
stop it after it had occurred. The arbitrator 
ruled that the grievant's actions violated 
the No-Strike clause of the collective-
bargaining agreement and his discharge 
was for just cause. Addressing the unfair 
labor practice issue the arbitrator stated 
that there was no evidence that the grie-
vant was discharged for his legitimate 
union activities. The regional director 
issued a complaint after investigating the 
grievant's unfair labor practice charges. 
Though the ALJ refused to defer, he dis-
missed the charges on the merits. The 
Board, applying Olin, refused to review 
the case on its merits and deferred. First, 
the Board stated that the contractual and 
statutory issues were factually parallel. 
Indeed, the arbitrator noted that the 
factual questions that he was required 
to determine were '1) whether or not 
there was a sick out and 2) whether the 
grievant caused, participated in or fail-
ed to attempt to stop the sick out, i.e., 
whether the grievant failed to meet the 
obligation imposed upon him by Arti-
cle XIV: These factual questions are 
co-extensive with those that would be 
considered by the Board in a decision 
on the statutory question - i.e., 
whether the collective-bargaining 
agreement clearly and unmistakably 
prescribed the behavior engaged in by 
Union President Spatorico on 17 
December, 1980.34 
Next, the Board stated that the General 
Counsel did not meet the burden of prov-
ing that the arbitrator was not presented 
with the facts necessary to determine the 
unfair labor practice issue. Finally, the 
Board ruled that the decision was not 
clearly repugnant to the Act because there 
was a reasonable basis to conclude that the 
grievant violated the No-Strike clause as 
well as an additional clause which prohi-
bited officers from encouraging similar 
activity. 
In dissent, member Zimmerman stated: 
The Airco proponents struck back in 
Suburban Motor Freight (1980).28 In Subur· 
ban Motor Freight, the grievant was ter-
minated twice by the company. Both 
times the grievant was reinstated with a 
reduced discipline by the arbitrator. The 
grievant then filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the Board claiming he was dis-
charged in violation of 8(a) (1) and (3). The 
company, relying on Electronic Reproduc· 
tion, argued that deferral was appropriate. 
It maintained that evidence of the alleged 
However, the Suburban Motor Freight, 
rule was short-lived. The Board again 
reversed its position regarding deferral in 
Olin Corporation (1984).32 Olin is the cur-
rent Board position on deferral. Today, 
the Board will defer to an existing arbitra-
tion award and find that an arbitrator has 
adequately considered an unfair labor prac-
tice issue if (1) the contractual issue is fac-
tually parallel to the unfair labor practice 
issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented 
generally with the facts relevant to resolv-
ing the unfair labor practice. The Board 
will weigh any differences between the 
contractual and statutory standards of 
review by the Spielberg "clearly repug-
nant" standard. Furthermore, the Board 
will not require an arbitrator's decision to 
be totally consistent with Board precedent under Electronic Reproduction and 
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under the rule adopted today the result 
is the same: The Board will now defer 
to an arbitrator's award on a presump-
tion that an unfair labor practice issue 
has been resolved, without actually 
knowing if the issue was presented to 
or considered by the arbitrator.35 
Zimmerman first argued that the Olin 
standard is an abdication of the Board's 
statutory obligations under Section 1o(a) 
of the Act. 
Nowhere in the Act itself, its legisla-
tive history, or in its judicial interpre-
tation is there authority for the propo-
sition that the federal labor policy 
favoring arbitration requires or per-
mits the Board to abstain from effec-
tuating the equally important federal 
labor policy entrusted to the Board 
under Section 10(a).36 
Secondly, Zimmerman cited several Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals decisions 
upholding the Suburban Motor Freight doc-
trine that the Board has no authority to 
defer if it has no proof that the arbitrator 
was presented with and considered the 
unfair labor practice issue. In Stephenson v. 
NLRB (1977) the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Merely because the arbitrator is pre-
sented with a problem which involved 
both contractual and unfair labor prac-
tice elements does not necessarily 
mean that he will adequately consider 
the statutory and merely because he 
considers the statutory issue does not 
mean that he will enforce the rights of 
the parties pursuant to and consistent 
with the Act.37 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit declared that the 
arbitrator must "clearly decide" the unfair 
labor practice issue before the Board may 
defer. Similarly, in United Parcel Seroice v. 
NLRB (1983) the Third Circuit ruled that 
"for the Board's deferral policy not to be 
one of abdication, the Board must be pre-
sented with some evidence that the statuto-
ry issue has actually been decided."38 
Third, Zimmerman criticized the overrul-
ing of You1&a and the new requirement 
that the party arguing against deferral 
must show that the Olin standard has not 
been met. According to Zimmerman, the 
party seeking deferral almost always has 
ready access to testimony and relevant 
records of the arbitration hearing and is in 
a better position to establish whether the 
statutory issue was addressed by the arbi-
trator. Furthermore, Zimmerman argued 
that it is improper to place the burden of 
proving an affirmative defense on any par-
ty other than the party raising the defense. 
To invoke a presumption and shift the 
burden of disproving a naked defense 
claim to the General Counsel amounts 
to an abuse of the Board's discretion. 
In effect, once the existence of an arbi-
tration award has been proved by a 
respondent, the majority will trans-
form an affirmative defense into part 
of the General Counsel's prima facie 
case.39 
Fourth, Zimmerman contended that the 
Olin standard, in reality, discourages par-
ties to arbitrate their differences. Accord-
ing to Zimmerman, the frequency of 
deferrals will strain the resources of 
involved parties and arbitrations will soon 
resemble unfair labor practice hearings as 
unions comply with their duties to fairly 
represent their members. 
While the Board in Olin departs from 
the Electronic Reproduction standard that 
deferral is appropriate where the grieving 
party could have brought evidence of the 
unfair labor practice issue before the arbi-
trator, it is similar to Electronic Reproduc-
tion in that it permits deferral without 
requiring proof that the arbitrator actually 
considered the statutory issue in his 
decision. The Board in Olin states that it 
must adhere to a "limited application" of 
''[the standard] 
permits deferral 
without requiring 
proof that the 
arbitrator actually 
considered the 
statutory issue." 
Raytheon to remain consistent with the 
Spielberg policy favoring the voluntary set-
tlement of disputes.4o Thus, while the 
Board states that adequate consideration of 
the unfair labor practice issue by the arbi-
trator is a criterion in judging the appro-
priateness of deferral, it defines adequate 
consideration as a factual parallelism of the 
contractual and statutory issue and the 
presentation of the facts of the unfair labor 
practice issue to the arbitrator. As long as 
the arbitrator's decision is not "palpably 
wrong" the Board will defer. 
A consensus has not been reached by the 
circuits concerning Olin. In Taylor v. 
NLRB, (1986}41 the eleventh circuit refused 
to uphold the Board's ruling to defer, stat-
ing that the Olin standard "gives away too 
much of the Board's responsibility under 
the NLRA."42 The eleventh circuit takes 
the position of the ninth circuit in Stephen· 
son, supra, and the third circuit in United 
Parce~ supra, that for the Board to fulfill 
it's statutory responsibility to prevent 
unfair labor practices under 10(a) of the 
N1.RA it cannot defer unless it has fully 
considered and resolved the statutory 
issue. The problem with Olin, according 
to the court, is that the standard cannot 
guarantee that all arbitration proceedings 
will address and resolve every unfair labor 
practice issue.43 While contractual and stat-
utory issues may be factually parallel, the 
issues may also "involve distinct elements 
of proof and questions of factual 
relevance."44 The court asserts that the 
failure of an arbitrator to fully examine 
and decide an unfair labor practice issue is 
an abandonment of the Spielberg doctrine's 
first requirement, that the arbitration pro-
ceedings have been fair and regular.45 
Additionally, the court also contends that 
the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander 
v.Gardner-Denver Co. (1974),46 that an 
employee may assert a Title VII claim 
independent of a grievance brought to 
arbitration under a collective bargaining 
agreement, stands for the proposition that 
deferral is not appropriate unless the arbi-
trator addressed and resolved the statutory 
issueY 
However, the second circuit in Nevins v. 
NLRB {1986}48 stated that the Board's right 
to defer an unfair labor practice charge to 
a pre-existing arbitration decision is discre-
tionary and absent abuse it will defer.49 
Thus, the court asserts that while it is not 
called upon to decide the issue of whether 
Olin sufficiently protects employee rights 
under the NLRA as was reached in Taylor, 
it does not challenge the Olin standard. 50 
Furthermore in Lewis v. NLRB, {1985'1 
the sixth circuit ruled that where there is 
evidence that the unfair labor practice 
issue was presented to and considered by 
the arbitrator it will find the Olin standard 
satisfied despite the fact that "the arbitra-
tion panel could have dealt more fully 
with the [statutory] issues presented at the 
hearing."52 The sixth circuit's apparent 
willingness to permit deferral where the 
unfair labor practice charge was not fully 
dealt with by the arbitrator confirms the 
eleventh circuit's main fear that under 
Olin, the Board presumes that all arbitra-
tion proceedings confront and decide 
every possible statutory issue when that 
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actually is not the case. 
The D.C. Circuit has previou<!.:; "ffirm-
ed Board deferral where the statutory and 
contractual issues were factually similar 
and the arbitrator decided the statutory 
issue. Bloom v. NLRB {1979}53. However, 
in Darr v. NLRB, (1986,' the court refused 
to affirm Board deferral where the arbitra-
tor's decision contradicted clear Board 
precedent. The court stated that while the 
arbitrator decided both the contractual 
and statutory issues the arbitrator con-
sidered the statutory issue in a "tentative 
fashion" and did not attempt to "reconcile 
the different bodies of applicable law."55 
The eleventh circuit commented: 
We have profound doubts that the 
Board may defer to an arbitrator's 
award merely because the award is 
roughly analogous to that which the 
Board would grant - a sort of "Ken-
tucky Windage" approach without 
explicitly articulating its view of the 
interrelationship between the law of a 
particular collective bargaining agree-
ment and the NLRA.56 
Conclusion 
The Board's policy of deferring unfair 
labor practice charges to pre-existing arbi-
tration awards has not been consistent. In 
Electronic Reproduction the Board revised 
it's policy set forth in Raytheon and Airco 
tht in order to defer it had to be proved 
that the arbitrator actually dealt with the 
statutory charge. Under Electronic Repro· 
duction the Board would defer where, 
absent unusual circumstances, the grievant 
had the opportunity to present the statuto-
ry issue to the arbitrator. With the excep-
tion of where the parties agreed to exclude 
the statutory issue from the arbitrator's 
consideration or where the arbitrator spe-
cifically refuses to deal with the statutory 
issue, the Board was not concerned with 
whether the arbitrator actually considered 
the issue. Suburban Motor Freight reestab-
lished the Board's pre-Electronic Reproduc-
tion policy of the arbitrator's duty to 
consider the unfair labor practice charge. 
Olin now states that the Board will find 
that the arbitrator has adequately con-
sidered the statutory issue when the con-
tractual' issue is factually parallel to the 
statutory issue and the arbitrator was pre-
sented with the facts relevant to resolving 
the unfair labor practice charge. 
The foregoing can be divided into two 
basic schools of thought on Board deferral. 
The first, represented by Raytheon and 
Suburban Motor Freight, requires that the 
Board actually consider the statutory issue 
before deferring. In contrast, the latter 
school of thought, endorsed by the Board 
in Electronic Reproduction and Olin does 
not necessarily demand actual considera-
tion to justify deferral. This has been criti-
cized as an abdication of the Board's duty 
under Section 10(a), of the NLRA, to pre-
vent unfair labor practices. The propo-
nents of the Electronic Reproduction and 
Olin, however point to Section 203(d) of 
the Labor Management Relations Act,57 
which amended the NLRA, delcaring that 
"final adjustment by a method agreed 
upon by the parties is ... the desirable 
method for settlement of grievance dis-
putes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an eXlstmg collective 
bargaining agreement."58 It is the Board's 
position that if the parties agree on arbitra-
tion as the preferred method of resolving 
disputes deferral is appropriate provided it 
is not repugnant to the Act. 
Whether Olin will continue to be the 
Board policy on deferral depends on 
whose administration replaces President 
Reagan's in January 1989. If the Republi-
cans remain in office it is most likely that 
George Bush will seek confirmation of 
conservative, pro-management appointees. 
A Republican dominated Board will likely 
wish to maintain the status quo (Olin). 
However, a Democratic administration, 
headed by Michael Dukakis, will likely 
appoint members who believe that 
workers statutory rights cannot be subor-
dinated to the arbitration process and who 
subscribe to the Raytheon· Suburban Motor 
Freight line of cases. 
Finally, in Alexander v. Gardner . 
Denver the Supreme Court declined to 
defer and declared that a worker has a 
right to have his Title VII claim adjudi-
cated regardless of whether he pursued a 
similar contractual claim through the arbi-
tration process. The court extended the 
Alexander v. Gardner· Denver holding to 
the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine 
v. Arkansas Best Freight System. 59 If and 
when the court is confronted with a case 
dealing with the Board's deferral of a Sec-
tion 7 or 8 claim to a pre-existing arbitra-
tion award, it will be interesting to see if 
the court similarly holds that a worker's 
statutory rights preclude the Board from 
deferring to the arbitration process. 
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